Nuclear Proliferation

In his statement to the North Atlantic Council, Dulles' states that nuclear weapons must be treated as being conventional weapons. His argument is that the defense of Europe against a potential Soviet invasion is only feasible through the use of tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet land forces because of the Soviet Union's superior numbers. Dulles states that the United States will use atomic weapons whenever it is to the military advantage of the US. He argues that such a stance is the only way to prevent aggression, to make the aggressor beleive he has nothing to gain by attacking.

This position is dangerous as it means the US would be the first to use nuclear weapons, resulting in an escalation of the situation and an almost certain retaliation. It would seem illogical to use nuclear weapons when retaliation would be the main result, but the very willingness to use nuclear weapons is what makes assured destruction work. In this sense, Dulles' logic is correct, the willingness to use nuclear weapons may have terrible results, but it also makes aggression less likely.

The effect nuclear weapons has had on the public perception towards war is quite large. Prime Minister Eden notes how the development of thermonuclear weapons and the growing awareness among the populace that any war in which nuclear weapons are used would be devastating is making people less likely to accept war or the maintenance of a large conventional military force. The terrible nature of nuclear weapons and the fact that they can be used as a substitution for conventional forces makes it possible to have a smaller military, and Eden predicts that this is what the public will demand.

Eden doesn't necessarily agree with this, but he does believe that the development of thermonuclear weapons has changed the dynamic in Europe and that a land invasion is no longer the greatest threat. This is a interesting idea, but I'm not sure how much history confirms it. In general, most populations are more reluctant to support a war or large conventional military forces, but I'm not sure how much of this is actually due to the development of nuclear weapons.

Mutually Assured Destruction

Bernard Brodie's argument on how the atomic bomb does not in fact make war impossible is quite interesting. He argues that an atomic bomb can be used without fear, when there no is chance of retaliation. Thus the more people that have the bomb, the less chance of aggression. This argument is not the one generally accepted today, where nuclear proliferation is something to be feared. In today's world we do not fear nuclear attacks from states so much as rogue groups, and the more states that have these weapons the more likely it is that one of these groups could get control of them.

Brodie's argument also assumes that leaders are rational people, which is not the case. In a world where everyone has nuclear weapons, the use of them would result in a deadly retaliation. A rational person would not authorize the use of the weapons in this scenario, but history is full of irrational decisions being made. Evidence suggests that the Cuban Missile Crisis may have come close triggering a nuclear war, despite the certainty of retaliation. The best way to prevent the use of nuclear weapons may be to lower the probability of them being used by have less nations have possession of them.

The logic behind the "Star Wars" and anti-ballistic missile system is to counter the threat of nuclear attacks from rogue states or groups, which are the threat today. However, the complex logic of nuclear deterrence still exists today, and the United States cannot build a AMB system without upsetting the nuclear "balance of power." Such a system could always be potential extended and expanded to be able to prevent nuclear attack from states with large arsenals. This could in theory make nuclear attack possible without retaliation. This could potentially trigger another arms race. Of course this is all moot because the AMB technology is still far from being able to accomplish anything significant. The AMB system may be more of a waste of money than anything at this time.

It is chilling how the consequences of a nuclear war were so coldly analyzed, particularly arguments such as Herman Kahn's. Kahn argues that the state of the country after a nuclear attack is not determined by the amount of people who died, but rather whether the "survivors envy the dead." However, he goes on to argue that studies indicate that a nuclear attack would not preclude happy and normal lives for the survivors.

The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Nuclear Power

Breeder reactors produces more fissile material than it destroys and is also more efficient, able to extract more energy from uranium than a burner. Despite this, breeders are controversial. The CANDU system is the more rival to breeders, and it operates using less heavily enriched uranium and heavy water. Breeder reactors may be more efficient, but they also produce fissile material that can be used for nuclear weapons, this is why they are so controversial. There exists a fear that building breeder reactors will encourage nuclear proliferation.

It is interesting how the reading suggests there is a divide in how the problem of nuclear waste is perceived. Nuclear waste and what to do with it is in the eyes of politicians and the populace one of the more significant problems when dealing with nuclear energy. Yet the readings suggest that scientists are not as concerned with this. Radioactive materials produced by reactors are not large in volume. The same is true with regards to chances of a nuclear meltdown or contamination. The evidence suggests that the chances of this is minuscule, yet there is still widespread fear of nuclear energy plants.

The entire issue of nuclear energy is made so complicated and controversial because of the innate fear people have of all things nuclear. This of course is a large contrast to earlier in the 20th century when there was so much enthusiasm for the atomic age. The perception that nuclear reactors are dangerous is perhaps more important than just how dangerous they truly are. The fear of a meltdown or contamination makes the creation of nuclear energy plants so controversial, even if the chances of this actually happening are very remote.

The truth is that society has been unwilling to accept the dangers of nuclear energy regardless of how small the chance of a meltdown or contamination. People don't like to think in terms of probability when dealing with a nuclear disaster.

The Space Race

Soviet The Soviet Union gained prestige by placing the first man in space, regardless of whether or not Soviet technology was in fact superior to American. All that mattered was perception, and with Sputnik, the Soviets created the impression that they had eclipsed the Americans in terms of the space race. Thus it became essential in the eyes of the Kennedy administration to "leapfrog" them. The space race was important because outdoing the Soviet Union would not only give international prestige to the US, but would also help to bolster Kennedy's image within America itself.

The difference between the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations if quite evident through the space program. Eisenhower was reluctant to spend money and did not have faith in the central government to manage large programs without being wasteful. Kennedy on the other hand felt that government spending was positive and that it in fact aided the economy. Thus Kennedy was far more willing to invest in large government projects such as the space program. Kennedy quickly realized the political opportunities that the space race afforded him and was willing to spend money.

There was the question of whether putting a man on the moon was a waste of resources. The Apollo missions were very significant diplomatically and symbolically, but they did not progress science as much considering the cost of the missions. It may have been better for research to invest in other scientific projects to advance our knowledge of space. But the Apollo missions were only a waste of resources if their main purpose was to advance science, and at least at the top, that was not necessarily the main intention. The purpose of these missions was to boost the prestige of the US government and the current administration in the eyes of the internationalo communities and the US citizens. And in this sense it was successful.

NASA was made the main vessel of US space policy as opposed to the Air Force, but this did not mean that the United States government was not concerned with the military applications of space. The US government was concerned that the space program always appeared to have peaceful intentions and that it was run by civilians. Yet the reality of it was the the US government was always conscious of how the space program could give the US a military advantage and often sought to exploit that.

These same intentions is what made the Apollo program obsolete by the 80s. Nixon was able to end the program so easily because the initial motivations for the program has ceased to exist or were no longer fulfilled by the space program.

Atomic Euphoria

Considering how nuclear weapons are viewed today, t is somewhat strange how much of cultural icon the atomic bomb was, both in America and the Soviet Union. The atomic bomb was a symbol of hope for the Soviet Union and for communism. Atomic energy and science was to be a panacea for economic and social problems. The idea that atomic science could better mankind is quite interesting. This technology is not viewed the same way today, at least not in my experience. Even nuclear power is treated with skepticism and often regarded as dangerous.

There were few controls on atomic research and science. In the Soviet Union, economic and political advancement were the main concern. Because of this safety and health were not prioritized. The power of the atomic bomb, both as a weapon and as a symbol seems to resulted in the scientists becoming arrogant. The importance of the bomb in Soviet culture gave these scientists a powerful position and the scientists were able to act with little restraint upon them. There was no public access or check upon their power and thus the arrogance of the scientists had a price. The Soviet engineers and scientists were not accountable to society, but only to a select group of party officials.

Soviet scientists such as Kurchatov and Sakharov sought to influence Soviet politics.n Kurchatov wanted to ban atmospheric testing and lessen Cold War tension. Sakharov was a spokesman for arms control., despite his involvement in the development of the hydrogen bomb. Rather than speak of a war between capitalism and communism, atomic science was used by these scientists as a way to unite people, rather than divide.

The power and influence of nuclear science and scientists is evident through how they were able to resist encroachments against their research like Lysenkoism with genetics. Physicists knew that the standard modern view of genetics was correct, not Lysenko's. Atomic scientists were able to hold views in complete contrast to Lysenkoism and suffer no consequences. Physics even helped to revive genetics and protect geneticists.

The Hydrogen Bomb and Oppenheimer Affair

It is interesting how Oppenheimer switched roles between the development of the original atomic bomb and the development of the hydrogen bomb. During the Manhattan Project Oppenheimer was one of the main proponents that it was not the responsibility of scientists to determine how and if the bomb was used and that the development and use of such a terrible weapon would prevent future wars. Yet Oppenheimer opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb for moral reasons. The guilt for developing the atomic bomb must have had a significant impact on Oppenheimer, for his opinion changed drastically.

Ironically enough, it was Oppenheimer's opponent Teller who articulated the arguments for the hydrogen bomb that most resembled Oppenheimer's arguments for the atomic bomb. Teller argued that it was inevitable that the hydrogen bomb would be build if it was possible. I'm inclined to agree with his argument. Even if the United States had not develop thermonuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would have.

The H-bomb is a terrible weapon, but his argument has proven true to a certain extent, no one has ever used a thermonuclear weapon. The hydrogen bomb is imprecise and isn't particularly practical as a weapon, but the very existence of such a weapon made the necessary for the United States the develop it, if for no other reason than to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining an advantage. The bomb wasn't developed by military need, but rather for diplomatic need.

I don't agree with Teller's argument that all knowledge is a good thing, the world would probably be better off if we didn't possess the knowledge to make thermonuclear weapons, but it was inevitable that someone would develop them. The readings make an issue over how the hydrogen bomb differed from the atomic bomb in that its primary target was civilians. One could also argue that this was also the case with the original atomic bomb. The atomic bomb was dropped on civilians in cities, it wasn't used as a tactical weapon. The atomic bomb has the potential to be used as a tactical weapon because it is more precise than the hydrogen bomb, but that wasn't how it was used. The difference between the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb is one of scale more than target. It may not be justifiable to use a hydrogen bomb, but no more than any nuclear weapon.

Oppenheimer's hearing is an example of how such hearings were more about politics than about whether a person was truly a "traitor." Oppenheimer's security clearance was due to expire regardless of the trial, and its main purpose was to discredit Oppenheimer and his causes, namely to eliminate any obstacle to developing the hydrogen bomb.

The American Atomic Bomb

One of the primary motivations for developing the bomb immediately was the fear that the Germans was do it first. This makes the how they worked harder to develop the bomb after victory in Europe all the more curious. Joseph Rotblat's resignation and statements make it clear that he regarded the directions of the bomb against the Soviet's as a betrayal of what he thought was the motivation of the Manhattan project. Yet, none of the other scientists at Los Alamos took the same stance as him at the time. The scientists wanted to finish the bomb before the war ended, to some extent they wanted the weapon to be used. They wanted to demonstrate their success and the power of the weapon they had created.

Oppenheimer's belief that demonstrating the horrific nature of the bomb would deter future is incredibly naive, but does have some basis in reality. The atomic bomb is regarded with horror and some part of the is because of the results of its use at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The idea of MAD and the fact that no nuclear weapon has been used since Nagasaki does lend credit to the idea that the world sees the weapon as too horrifying to use except as a last resort.

It is somewhat appalling how the scientists at Los Alamos, by their own admission, were unconcerned with the moral issues of developing the bomb at the time. When using the bomb they didn't attempt to ensure that it was against a military target, to the contrary they wanted it used against a target of great importance that would have a large psychological impact. They in effect endorsed the use of the atomic bomb against a civilian population. The suggestion of using the bomb on a deserted island as a demonstration to the world was shot down.

Oppenheimer argued that it is not the responsibility of scientists to determine how their advanced are used. He surrender all such responsibility to the military and political leaders. All scientists did not agree with him. The Chicago scientists show that many were concerned with the moral aspects and how the government was using science. I wonder how much Oppenheimer belied in his own argument, for he demonstrated obvious guilt over what the bomb had done. Oppenheimer told Truman that he had blood of his hands.